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DEBATING THE END OF THE WORLD AND OTHER POINTLESS 
ENDEAVORS: THOMAS v. STATE AND THE CIVIL COMMITMENT 
OF SEX OFFENDERS IN MISSOURI AFTER KANSAS v. CRANE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
David Siebers served ten years for rape and armed robbery in Michigan.1  
Just months after being released, he was caught trying to lure a ten year old girl 
into his car with candy.2  Siebers was released from prison the second time in 
September 2002, and since then has been forced to live in four different states 
because of both government and public harassment.3  Since moving to New 
Mexico, Siebers has been under constant surveillance by local police upon 
orders of the mayor, had signs posted on a fence near where he lives that read 
“Go back where you came from – Hell,” and has been physically assaulted 
while doing yard work.4  The mayor of Albuquerque, who ordered police 
surveillance, justified the action by saying that an FBI profile showed that 
Siebers continues to be dangerous and “will re-offend.”5 
Siebers represents the inherent problems with society’s struggle in dealing 
with sex offenders.  His situation illustrates both the patchwork manner in 
which different states have dealt with the perceived continuing threat posed by 
sex offenders and the inherent problems such a system creates, both for the 
public at large and those previously convicted of sexual offenses. 
The general public’s fear of convicted sex offenders has resulted in 
legislatures being pushed hard to enact serious restraints and controls against a 
group of individuals deemed dangerous to civilized society, particularly to 
women and children.  The most prominent example of this trend is the 
institution of “Megan’s Law” in numerous states, mandating that 
neighborhoods and local police officials be informed of the presence of a sex 
 
 1. Sex Offender Run Out of 4 States, CNN.com, Jan. 16, 2002 available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Southwest/01/16/sex.offender.ap/index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 
2002). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  Siebers originally resided in Michigan upon his release from prison, then moved to 
Ohio, where police bought him a bus ticket to Kentucky.  Id.  He has since moved in his trailer to 
rural New Mexico.  Id. 
 4. Sex Offender Run Out of 4 States, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. (emphasis added). 
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offender residing in a community.6  This type of governmental action only 
makes the public aware of the presence of such a threat.  Sixteen states have 
moved to more punitive and restrictive measures to protect society from the 
threat of sexual predators, namely civil commitment of convicted sex 
offenders. 
The most prominent player in this new movement has been the state of 
Kansas, which twice has had cases challenging its statute7 taken to the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  In the first case, Kansas v. Hendricks,8 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such statutes, finding that the 
statute in question dealt with a civil, not criminal act, and did not violate the 
double jeopardy or ex post facto lawmaking clause of the Constitution.9  The 
Court further decided that the requirements for commitment in the Kansas 
statute were sufficient to rebut any claims of violation of substantive due 
process requirements.10  Having upheld the constitutionality of these 
commitment actions, states then returned to the task of implementing their 
statutes in light of Hendricks.  It was the battle over this implementation in 
Kansas that lead to the Supreme Court reaffirming Hendricks in Kansas v. 
Crane.11 
In Crane, the state of Kansas moved to have Michael Crane committed 
under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.12  A Kansas District Court 
ordered Crane committed for “treatment” after a trial,13 but the Kansas 
Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the Kansas and United 
 
 6. Megan’s Laws began in New Jersey and mandate that convicted sex offenders register 
with local authorities and that communities be informed of a sex offender living in their 
neighborhood.  Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative 
Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 315 (2001) (tracing the development of the legislative processes that 
have led to the creation of such statutes). 
 7. KAN. STAT. ANN. art. 29a, §§ 59-29a01– 59-29a20 (Supp. 2002).  The Kansas 
Legislature passed the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in 1994.  The Act called for the 
commitment of sexually violent predators in light of their likelihood “to engage in repeat acts of 
sexual violence if not treated for their mental abnormality or personality disorder . . .  [and] to 
address the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks they present to society . . . .”  
Id. at § 59-29a01.  Subsequent sections of the Act describe how sexual predators are to be 
identified, how civil commitment proceedings will be conducted, and how confinement of sexual 
predators must proceed.  Id. at §§ 59-29a02 – 59-29a20. 
 8. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  This case dealt with the commitment of Leroy Hendricks, a 
Kansas man convicted of molesting two young boys.  Id. at 353.  For a complete discussion of 
this case, see infra Section III, Part A. 
 9. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369-370. 
 10. Id. at 360. 
 11. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 12. Id. at 410-11.  Crane was diagnosed by a state psychiatrist as suffering from both 
exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder.  Id. at 411.  For a complete discussion of this 
case, see infra Section III, Part B. 
 13. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411. 
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States Constitutions require “a finding that the defendant cannot control his 
dangerous behavior” for such a commitment to be legal.14  The United States 
Supreme Court in Crane vacated the Kansas Supreme Court decision that the 
state must prove the offender has a total or complete lack of control in order to 
be committed.15  To prevent this type of abuse, Crane established a distinction 
between “the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, 
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment” and “the dangerous 
but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”16  The Crane 
Court was very concerned with the possibility that civil commitment could 
“become a ‘mechanism for retribution or general deterrence’” instead of a 
mechanism for sex offender treatment.17  Punishment for the Court is a 
function of criminal law, not civil commitment. 
Crane not only affected Kansas, but also every state with a sexually violent 
predator statute, including Missouri.18  Fewer than four months after the Crane 
decision, in May of 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court handed down its 
interpretation of Crane’s “serious difficulty in controlling behavior” 
requirement in Thomas v. State.19  The day before his scheduled release from 
prison, the state of Missouri filed a petition to commit him as a sexual 
offender.20  A jury trial of eight individuals found that the state had established 
that Thomas was a sexually violent predator and ordered him committed.21  
Thomas appealed this commitment order based on his argument that the statute 
itself was unconstitutional and that the instructions given to the jury were 
inadequate under both Hendricks and Crane.22 
The Missouri Supreme Court decided that Crane requires an explicit jury 
instruction on the level of difficulty in controlling behavior.23  This 
 
 14. Id. (citing In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286-88, 290 (Kan. 2000)). 
 15. Id. at 411, 415. 
 16. Id. at 413 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58). 
 17. Id. at 412 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurrence)). 
 18. Missouri’s sexual predator law reads similarly to the one from Kansas.  It allows for the 
civil commitment of “any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person 
more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure 
facility.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (1999). 
 19. 74 S.W.3d 789 (Mo. 2002).  Eddie Thomas was convicted in 1982 of multiple sexually 
violent offenses.  Id. at 790.  For a complete discussion of this case, see infra Section IV, Part A. 
 20. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  Thomas’s case was considered along with the case of Desi Edwards, a convicted 
child rapist who was targeted for commitment after being returned to prison for a parole violation 
involving the use of alcohol.  Id. 
 23. Id. at 792.  The Court laid out the following instruction that must be given in these cases: 
“As used in this instruction, ‘mental abnormality’ means a congenital or acquired condition 
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually 
violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his 
behavior.”  Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 792. 
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requirement of a specific jury instruction on this issue is one that has been 
rejected by numerous other states with similar civil commitment statutes.24  
Indeed, Chief Justice Limbaugh of the Missouri Supreme Court took the 
opposite position in his dissenting opinion, believing instead that “the given 
instruction, though couched in different language, necessarily required that 
same ‘proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.’”25  This conflict over 
jury instructions is at the heart of the difficulties with the Crane decision.  
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Crane, identified this problem as necessarily 
resulting from the majority’s decision.  As he asked, “[h]ow is one to frame for 
a jury the degree of ‘inability to control’ which, in the particular case, ‘the 
nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality’ 
require?”26  While Justice Scalia keenly identified the coming split amongst the 
states in interpreting Crane, his dissent also provided sufficient support for 
Missouri and other courts that have mandated a specific jury instruction on 
lack of control.  Scalia’s entire line of argument shows the validity of the 
Thomas approach and why Crane requires an explicit jury instruction on 
inability to control behavior. 
Section II of this Note will begin with a look at the history of civil 
commitment of sexual offenders and the debate over the purpose and 
constitutionality of these statutes, focusing on the motivations and 
justifications for such laws and criticisms of the necessity and effectiveness of 
such measures.  Section III will consist of an in-depth analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Hendricks and Crane and will lay a foundation for an 
analysis of Missouri’s sexually violent predator law and the state Supreme 
Court’s decision in Thomas.  The analysis of Thomas will be completed in 
Section IV and will be compared with other states’ interpretation of Crane.  
Finally, in Section V, an analysis of the Thomas approach will be conducted.  
By looking at both Missouri commitment cases subsequent to Thomas and 
collateral issues dealing with commitment, this Note will conclude that the 
dispute over jury instructions is a minor sideshow at best.  Ultimately, 
 
 24. See In re Westerheide, 831 So. 2d 93, 109 (Fla. 2002) (finding instructions that required 
jury to find serious difficulty without using such words acceptable); In re Commitment of John 
Lee Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. 2002) (finding a “nexus” between individual’s dangerousness 
and mental disorder enough to satisfy Crane); People v. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d 459, 465 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2002) (finding nature and severity of mental disorder in sexual predator cases enough to 
satisfy constitutional standards); In re Dutil, 768 N.E.2d 1055, 1058 (Mass. 2002) (finding mental 
disorder and lack of control implicit in current jury instructions).  But see In re Detention of 
Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (finding that the jury instruction on the term “mental 
abnormality” was inadequate because it did not require a showing of serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior and adopting the instruction laid out by the Missouri Supreme Court in 
Thomas).  For a complete discussion of these cases, see infra Section IV, Part B. 
 25. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 792 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). 
 26. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas, who 
wrote the majority opinion in Hendricks, joined in this dissent. 
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requiring an instruction on difficulty in controlling behavior does not affect the 
fear of sexual offenders that continues to drive the creation of such statutes and 
almost universally guarantees the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders 
by a jury of eight average citizens. 
II.  CIVIL COMMITMENT – HISTORY, JUSTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Having a historical understanding of the development of this area of law 
and some of the scientific evidence provides a unique insight into the 
motivation for sexually violent predator laws.  This section will examine other 
governmental actions that deal with the “problem” of sexual offenders besides 
sexually violent predator laws, analyze the history of commitment proceedings 
in this century, and compare the scientific arguments regarding the sensibility 
and fairness of civil commitment of sex offenders. 
A. “Megan’s Law” and Registration of Sex Offenders 
The murder of Megan Kanka in 1994 prompted the first round of 
registration and community notification laws dealing with sex offenders.27  
Megan was raped and murdered by her neighbor Jesse Timmendequas, who 
was twice convicted for sexual offenses involving minors.  Timmendequas 
luring her to her death with the promise of seeing a puppy.28  Megan’s parents 
then began a public campaign to get the state legislature to pass a community 
notification law.  Their efforts resulted in New Jersey quickly passing the first 
of what were to become known as “Megan’s Laws.”29  By 1996 Congress had 
taken measures to require every state to adopt community notification 
measures, and today every state has some version of Megan’s Law.30  These 
laws were designed to deal with a growing national concern about habitual sex 
offenders, and provide society with “a feeling of safety and offer[ing] citizens 
a chance to conduct their lives accordingly.”31  These laws indeed meet the 
goal of increasing society’s perception of safety, but at the same time raise 
serious concerns about the rights, treatment, and even safety of men and 
women labeled as society’s newest outcasts—the sex offender.32 
 
 27. Leora Sedaghati, Megan’s Law: Does it Serve to Protect the Community or Punish and 
Brand Sex Offenders?, 3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 27, 27 (2001). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Filler, supra note 6, at 315-16. 
 30. Id. at 316. 
 31. Sedaghati, supra note 27, at 27. 
 32. See Alex B. Eyssen, Does Community Notification for Sex Offenders Violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment? A Focus on Vigilantism 
Resulting From “Megan’s Law,” 33 ST. MARY’s L.J. 101 (2001) (arguing that such laws add 
little additional benefits to the public and offer little assistance to communities in dealing with sex 
offenders personally known to their victims and urging government officials to be proactive in 
preventing vigilantism against sex offenders). 
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B. Historical Development of Sex Offender Laws 
To put the current developments of sexual offender laws in a proper 
context, it is necessary to examine past societal attempts to manage sexual 
offenders.  Perhaps the best description of the twentieth century treatment of 
sex offenders is that offered by Samuel Brakel and James Cavanaugh, who 
have described this history as involving the so-called “pendulum effect.”33  
Brakel and Cavanaugh have broken down approaches to dealing with sex 
offenders in the twentieth century into four distinct periods: (1) 
undifferentiated treatment; (2) rehabilitation; (3) a return to undifferentiated 
treatment; and (4) the modern approach.34  A brief summary of each of these 
periods amply demonstrates that the current batch of sexually violent predator 
laws is not a new development or innovation, but rather a method of control 
and problem resolution attempted unsuccessfully in our recent past. 
Brakel and Cavanaugh identify the first period as that of “undifferentiated 
treatment,” dating up to approximately 1930.35  During this period, sex 
offenders were treated like most other criminals.  Criminal convictions were 
sought and incarceration was the accepted punishment, with the hope that the 
specific offender and potential other offenders would be deterred from such 
actions in the future.36  After the 1930s, a new approach to sexual offenders 
began to emerge, with a new emphasis on rehabilitation and treatment of the 
sex offender.37  Sexually deviant behavior was separated for legal purposes 
from other types of criminal behavior to exact the rehabilitation and treatment 
purpose.38  This period was to be the “heyday of the sexual psychopath 
laws.”39 
The rehabilitation period’s crowning endorsement can be traced to a 1940 
Supreme Court decision, Pearson v. Probate Court, upholding the 
constitutionality of the newly created statutes that called for separate treatment 
of sex offenders.40  Brakel and Cavanaugh state that that decision: 
 
 33. Samuel J. Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and 
Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 69 (2000). 
 34. Id. at 69-77. 
 35. Id. at 70. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 71. 
 38. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 71. 
 39. Id. at 70-71. 
 40. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (upholding a Minnesota 
statute as both significantly narrow in constitutional terms and finding that it did not implicate 
equal protection concerns).  It is interesting to note that Brakel and Cavanaugh were critical of 
this decision because “[i]t simply said—in a classic case of substituting conclusion for 
argument—that there was ‘no reason for doubt’ that the legislature’s selection of the targeted 
class had a ‘rational basis.’”  Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 71.  Evidence of such 
circular logic is also found in later Supreme Court cases dealing with sex offender statutes and 
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[R]eflected, as well as bolstered, the general optimism that prevailed in 
relevant circles about the ability to identify and treat those among the 
amorphous aggregation of sex offenders who would benefit from the 
ministrations of the sexual psychopath laws.41 
By the 1950s, more than half of the states had passed similar measures and 
were processing hundreds of sex offenders through these statutes each year.42 
Brakel and Cavanaugh attribute the success of these laws and efforts to the 
substantial consensus that existed amongst the law and psychiatry as to the 
mechanisms and objectives of the sex offender acts enacted by the states.43  
The “rehabilitative ideal” was an idea held generally by members of both 
professions, and “its implementation via indeterminate institutionalization in 
treatment facilities in lieu of imprisonment went essentially unchallenged.”44  
A number of developments led to the downfall of these statutes.  First, 
practical experience and scientific theory undercut the idea that sexual 
psychopaths could be rationally distinguished from others exhibiting deviant 
behavior and successfully treated.45  Second, a societal shift occurred, placing 
more of an emphasis on “law and order” issues and calling for the adoption of 
a more punitive approach to criminal offenders.46  These developments caused 
more than half of the states to get rid of the sex offender statutes by the mid-
1980s and the remaining five states with sexually violent predator laws used 
these laws so infrequently that they virtually did not exist.47 
A decision by the Supreme Court would sound the death knell of these 
efforts and mark the beginning of the third period Brakel and Cavanaugh 
identify.48  In Specht v. Patterson, the Court mandated the use of almost all 
procedural safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants in commitment 
proceedings.49  This decision, combined with the increasing questions about 
the effectiveness of treatment, resulted in a return to the pre-1930s 
 
may speak to inherent difficulties for justifying the unequal treatment of sex offenders. See infra 
text accompanying note 119. 
 41. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 71. 
 42. Id. at 71-72.  In the mid-1960s, California was committing sex offenders at the rate of 
approximately 800 offenders per calendar year.  Id. 
 43. Id. at 72. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 73. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  The five states were Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon and Washington.  
Id. 
 48. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (dismissing Colorado’s argument that its 
version of the law was civil in nature and a type of sentencing decision, and instead requiring the 
institution of significant procedural safeguards usually found in criminal trials). 
 49. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 73-74.  These rights included a judicial hearing, 
assistance of counsel, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, the right to present 
witnesses and evidence, and the right to an appeal.  Id. 
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undifferentiated treatment from other types of criminal offenders.50  In the 
1990s, a new rash of highly publicized cases of sexually violent crimes against 
children recreated the impetus for the current set of sexual offender 
commitment statutes that emerged in the states beginning in the early 1990s, 
the modern or final period identified by Brakel and Cavanaugh.51 
The earliest example of a highly publicized sexually violent crime against 
a child occurred in Washington in 1989.52  At that time, Earl Shriner, a recently 
released sex offender who had been serving time for the kidnapping and sexual 
assault of two teenage girls, raped a seven-year-old boy and cut off the boy’s 
genitals, leaving him to die.53  This heinous crime has been directly attributed 
to the public outcry that led Washington’s legislators to pass the first in a new 
line of sex offender laws.54 
C. Scientific Studies on Sexual Offender Recidivism and Treatment 
The debate on the danger posed by convicted sex offenders, like most 
debates, has two sides.  Dennis Doren, a frequent state expert witness in civil 
commitment cases, believes that sexual recidivism for a certain group of 
offenders is a rather common occurrence and that such repeat conduct is 
currently under-reported.55  Doren argues that numerous factors, such as a 
focus on convictions as opposed to accusations, limited timelines of analysis, 
unreported crimes, and the ignoring of females as sex offenders, have all 
contributed to the under-reporting and estimation of recidivism rates among 
past sex offenders.56  According to Doren’s analysis and research, recidivism 
for child molesters can be estimated conservatively at fifty-two percent, and 
the conservative estimate for rapists is approximately forty percent.57  As he 
states, these figures show that “sex offender recidivism is far more than a rare 
event” as previous clinical studies have indicated, and the rates he has 
established are such that “discriminating characteristics between recidivists 
and non-recidivists may be useful in the differential prediction of which 
offenders are likely to commit new sexual crimes and which are not.”58 
 
 50. Id. at 74. 
 51. Id. at 74-75.  For a discussion of some of these states, see infra Section IV, Part B. 
 52. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 75. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Dennis M. Doren, Recidivism Base Rates, Predictions of Sex Offender Recidivism, and 
the ‘Sexual Predator’ Commitment Laws, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 97 (1998). 
 56. Id. at 99-100. 
 57. Id. at 108. 
 58. Id. 
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Others who have evaluated the topic of sex offender recidivism take issue 
with the high rates that Doren has cited.59  The impression left by reading 
studies in this field is that the varying types of offenders who are subject to 
commitment under sexual predator statutes may re-offend in very different 
manners and at very different rates.  A good example of this dichotomy is the 
comparative studies, which have been done on recidivism of rapists and child 
molesters.  Studies of rapists have found a higher risk of relapse into violent 
behavior in the short term, while analysis of child molesters has revealed a 
much longer period in which an offender might re-engage in high-risk sexual 
behavior and a lesser ability to resist deviant sexual urges.60  Likewise, studies 
on the behavior of rapists have found quite different motivations for deviant 
sexual acts that result in differing abilities to control behavior.61  Some sex 
offenders in this area arguably are driven to deviant behavior by poor impulse 
control exhibited in a variety of behaviors, while others commit sexual assaults 
as part of a criminal lifestyle incorporating frequent expressions of aggression 
and control.62  Behavioralists studying this phenomenon have argued that these 
variances among sex offenders should be taken into account in designing 
programs of treatment and methods of preventing sexual predators from 
lapsing into deviant behavior.63  The uncertainty of this area, combined with 
the difficulties of assessment systems employed by states in assessing sex 
offenders under their sexual predator statutes, have led some to conclude that 
the current risk-assessment procedures that are vital to commitment 
proceedings are so deficient that they undermine the validity of expert 
testimony on the subject in a legal proceeding.64 
Leonore Simon has taken this argument one step further, arguing that 
studies show that sex offenders are neither specialists in sex crimes nor 
mentally disordered.65  The implications of such findings in the realm of sexual 
predator laws are apparent.  As Simon argues, “legal and mental health 
professionals continue to operate on the assumption that offenders who commit 
sex crimes are mentally disordered, treatable, dangerous (if not treated), and at 
 
 59. See Richard Wollert, Adversarial Forum: An Analysis of the Argument That Clinicians 
Under-Predict Sexual Violence in Civil Commitment Cases, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 171 (2001) 
(arguing that  Doren’s conclusions are  based on untenable assertions). 
 60. Timothy J. McGuire, Correctional Institution Based Sex Offender Treatment: A Lapse 
Behavior Study, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 57, 60 (2000). 
 61. Id. at 61. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (arguing that greater attention needs to be paid to the early signs of lapse behavior 
that are unique to different types of offenders to prevent recidivism). 
 64. Terence W. Campbell, Sexual Predator Evaluations and Phrenology: Considering Issues 
of Evidentiary Reliability, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 111 (2000). 
 65. Leonore M.J. Simon, An Examination of the Assumptions of Specialization, Mental 
Disorder, and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 275 (2000). 
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high risk to reoffend with another sex crime.”66  These mistaken assumptions 
result in an overly exclusive focus on sex offenders, which he believes lulls the 
public into a false sense of security.67  According to Simon, “[t]he murderer, 
robber, burglar, or addict moving into the neighborhood is no less likely to 
commit crimes than is the convicted sex offender.”68  Ultimately, 
[a]lthough some sex offenders are at a high risk to re-offend, there is no clear 
empirical basis for assessing which sex offenders present the most immediate 
risk for reoffending.  Also, there is no evidence that sex offenders are any more 
mentally disordered than general criminal offenders.  The primary pathology 
attributed to sex offenders, deviant sexual arousal, is beginning to be 
discredited empirically.69 
If Simon is correct, the entire foundation of sexual predator laws, based upon 
the twin notions that sex offenders pose a special danger to the public and 
suffer from a treatable mental illness, is severely weakened. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN – THE RATIONALE OF HENDRICKS AND 
CRANE 
In the early to mid-1990s, civil commitment laws began to spring up in a 
number of states, and defendants began to raise new constitutional challenges 
to these statutes.  The Supreme Court had an important say in how these laws 
were constructed and construed.  The Court decided the constitutionality of 
these measures in Hendricks, and then clarified its decision in Crane, a second 
Kansas case that dealt with the actual requirements for committing a sexually 
violent predator under a civil commitment act. 
A. Hendricks and the Constitutionality of Civil Commitment 
The Supreme Court first tackled the issue of the constitutionality of sexual 
predator laws in 1997 when it took up the case of Leroy Hendricks, a Kansas 
man who was convicted of taking indecent liberties with two separate thirteen-
year-old boys70 and was sentenced to serve between five and twenty years in 
prison.71  The Kansas Legislature had enacted its version of a civil 
commitment act in 1994 to deal with the special problem of sexually violent 
 
 66. Id. at 278. 
 67. Id. at 280. 
 68. Id.  Simon believes that this is true because nearly three-quarters of general criminals 
and sixty percent of rape and sexual assault offenders are on probation or parole and as a group, 
recommit at a rate of sixty percent.  Id.  Of those on probation, approximately forty percent of 
violent crime offenders are re-arrested in a three-year period, while only twenty percent of rapists 
on probation are re-arrested in the same time period.  Simon, supra note 65, at 280. 
 69. Id. at 284. 
 70. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351-53 (1997). 
 71. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996). 
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predators.72  The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (“KSVPA”) allowed 
for the civil commitment of a sexually violent predator for the purposes of 
“long-term control, care and treatment.”73  The KSVPA defined a sexually 
violent predator as: 
Any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent 
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder 
which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual 
violence.74 
The KSVPA then defined what was meant by a mental abnormality: 
[A mental abnormality is a] congenital or acquired condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit 
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the 
health and safety of others.75 
At his trial, Hendricks was called by the State of Kansas as a witness76 and 
admitted that he was unable to control his sexual urges when he became 
“stressed out.”  He also admitted that he was a pedophile who was not cured of 
his condition, despite his time in jail and his previous stays in mental 
institutions.77  A jury found that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator.  He 
was committed by the State to a mental hospital where no treatment program 
for sexual violent predators was in place at the time of his commitment.78  The 
Kansas Supreme Court took up Hendricks’ appeal and in reading the 
underlying motives of the KSVPA, decided that the Kansas statute violated the 
substantive due process rights of those ordered committed under the KSVPA.79 
The Kansas Supreme Court cited a number of reasons for reaching this 
decision as to the constitutionality of civil commitment acts.  In finding a 
denial of proper due process, the court focused on the failure of the KSVPA to 
 
 72. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351. 
 73. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (Supp. 2002). 
 74. Id. at § 59-29a02(a). 
 75. Id. at § 59-29a02(b). 
 76. For a discussion of this ability of the state to call a target of a civil commitment 
proceeding as a witness, see the discussion of evidentiary issues, infra Section V. 
 77. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Kan. 1996).  Evidence was also admitted during 
the trial to show that Hendricks had a long history of sexual abuse of children apart from the 
incidents that led to his most recent arrest and confinement, including four cases of molestation 
and one incident of indecent exposure.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354. 
 78. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.  Hendricks was put in the custody of Larned State 
Hospital at the order of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for the state of Kansas.  
Id.  While the Secretary’s office had negotiated with two prospective providers for the care and 
treatment of those committed under the Act, no contract had been reached with either at the time 
of Hendricks’ commitment.  Id.  Hendricks’ motion to dismiss based on this fact was denied by 
the trial judge. Id.  For a discussion of the available treatment options for sexual offenders, see 
supra Section II. 
 79. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138. 
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separate those subject to commitment under the KSVPA from other types of 
criminal offenders.  The court was also concerned about the failure of the 
KSVPA to address issues of treatment, a fact the court relied on in viewing the 
Act as a veiled attempt to continue incarceration of sexual offenders.80  In this 
part of its decision, the court distinguished between mental illness, mental 
abnormalities, and personality disorders.  The KSVPA, according to the 
Kansas Court, allows for the commitment of the latter, even though the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated that “to indefinitely confine as dangerous one who has a 
personality disorder or antisocial personality but is not mentally ill is 
constitutionally impermissible.”81  The second conclusion the court reached 
was based significantly on the legislative history of the KSVPA.  The court 
recognized that “[t]reatment with the goal of reintegrating [sexually violent 
offenders] into society is incidental” and that “treatment for sexually violent 
predators is all but nonexistent.”82  Having found predominate motives besides 
treatment for the KSVPA, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the commitment 
judgment against Hendricks.83 
In 1996 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the case and 
handed down its decision in Hendricks in June 1997.84  The majority opinion, 
written by Justice Clarence Thomas, overturned the decision of the Kansas 
Supreme Court, and upheld the constitutionality of civil commitment 
proceedings for sex offenders.85  In so doing, the majority refused to adopt the 
“mental illness” standard that the Kansas Court adopted.86  In addition, the 
Court dismissed all of Hendricks’ claims that commitment constituted 
punishment and therefore violated double jeopardy and the ban on ex post 
facto lawmaking.87 
Justice Thomas rejected Hendricks’ claims that the KSVPA constituted a 
criminal proceeding that rendered his confinement a punishment that violated 
both the double jeopardy and ex post facto lawmaking provisions of the 
Constitution.88  In one of the more interesting parts of the decision, Justice 
Thomas found that the statute was civil on its face and a statute in which the 
legislature did not seek “to create anything other than a civil commitment 
 
 80. Id. at 136. 
 81. Id. at 138 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992) (allowing the release of a 
defendant who was found guilty at trial by reason of insanity and who no longer was insane, but 
who was still considered dangerous because of  his anti-social personality)). 
 82. Id. at 136. 
 83. Id. at 138. 
 84. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 358. 
 87. Id. at 358-63. 
 88. Id. at 360-61. 
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scheme designed to protect the public from harm.”89  Justice Thomas reached 
this decision despite the fact that the Kansas district court found in its 
examination of the legislative history of the KSVPA, that it was designed to 
allow the indefinite confinement of those who are dangerous but not mentally 
ill.90 
The Court also did not find the KSVPA to be criminal in nature because it 
did not have the twin goals of criminal law, namely retribution and 
deterrence.91  Justice Thomas instead held that the fact that the KSVPA 
subjected more than those who were convicted of previous offenses to 
commitment, meant that the KSVPA did “not affix culpability for prior 
criminal conduct” but rather used such conduct “solely for evidentiary 
purposes.”92  The deterrence element was not met because people suffering 
from a “mental abnormality” are unable to control their behavior and are thus 
“unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.”93  Confinement in a 
mental institution is not considered to be as restrictive as a confinement in 
prison.  Those committed to a mental hospital under a sexually violent predator 
law do not fall within the definition of those being punished by the State.94 
The majority opinion also recognized that a “finding of dangerousness, 
standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify 
indefinite involuntary commitment.”95  This finding had to be coupled with an 
additional factor, such as mental illness, “limit[ing] involuntary civil 
commitment to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them 
dangerous beyond their control.”96  The additional requirements in the KSVPA 
are the terms “mental abnormality” and “personality disorder.”97  Justice 
Thomas reasoned that both terms allow the statute to meet the requirement that 
“it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are 
unable to control their dangerousness.”98  Hendricks then was adequately 
distinguishable from “other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly 
dealt with exclusively though criminal proceedings” and not in the position of 
having his due process rights violated.99 
 
 89. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
 90. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996).  For an examination of the problems 
and inherent liabilities involved in a determination that these sexually violent predator statutes are 
actually civil and not criminal proceedings, see infra Section V. 
 91. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62. 
 92. Id. at 362. 
 93. Id. at 362-63. 
 94. Id. at 363. 
 95. Id. at 358. 
 96. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358. 
 97. Id. at 362. 
 98. Id. at 358. 
 99. Id. at 360. 
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Justice Thomas also addressed the treatment issue raised by the Kansas 
Supreme Court.  Justice Thomas found that availability of treatment was not a 
precondition to constitutional civil commitment as a sexually violent predator, 
but rather that “civil confinement of the dangerously insane” is acceptable even 
if no form of treatment exists.100  Justice Thomas disagreed with the Kansas 
Supreme Court that the focus on punishment renders the KSVPA 
unconstitutional, finding instead that even if punishment were the overriding 
purpose of the KSVPA, “this does not rule out the possibility that an ancillary 
purpose of the Act was to provide treatment, and it does not require [the Court] 
to conclude that the Act is punitive.”101  Kansas’ attempt at treatment then, no 
matter how meager, fits the requirement that confinement must not double as 
punishment.102 
Having established the civil nature of the KSVPA, Justice Thomas quickly 
dismissed any arguments about double jeopardy and ex post facto lawmaking.  
Determining that the statute is a proper civil remedy that is not punishment, the 
fact that Hendricks was finishing a prison sentence when proceedings against 
him began did not affect the double jeopardy analysis.103  Justice Thomas then 
found the ex post facto argument to be “similarly flawed,” as it applies 
exclusively to criminal statutes and not civil laws.104  Each of the findings by 
Justice Thomas was based on his analysis of the punitive and civil nature of the 
KSVPA, and it was for these conclusions that he was widely criticized. 
The first group to challenge Thomas’ majority opinion in Hendricks was 
the dissenters, led by Justice Breyer.  Justice Breyer, like Justice Thomas, did 
not adopt the substantive due process approach taken by the Kansas Supreme 
Court.105  Instead, the dissent took issue with the argument that the KSVPA 
was simply an effort at civil commitment, arguing instead that it was an effort 
at further punishment of sex offenders like Hendricks.106  For Breyer, 
“[c]ertain resemblances between the Act’s ‘civil commitment’ and traditional 
criminal punishments are obvious.”107 
The key factor in Breyer’s punitive analysis was the fact that any treatment 
that may be available is delayed until after the completion of a prior prison 
sentence.108  The fact that the Kansas Supreme Court found the purpose of the 
KSVPA to be mainly punitive, combined with the fact that “[t]he Act explicitly 
 
 100. Id. at 366. 
 101. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367. 
 102. Id. at 368-69. 
 103. Id. at 369 (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966)). 
 104. Id. at 370. 
 105. Id. at 373. (agreeing with the majority’s assessment as to the definition of “mental 
abnormality”). 
 106. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373. 
 107. Id. at 379. 
 108. Id. at 381. 
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defers diagnosis, evaluation, and commitment proceedings until a few weeks 
prior to the ‘anticipated release’ of a previously convicted offender from 
prison,” helped the dissent reach the conclusion that treatment was not a 
particularly important objective to the Kansas Legislature when it wrote the 
KSVPA.109 
The Hendricks decision has also been attacked as being an abuse of civil 
commitment, ignorant of the work that had been done in the field of mental 
illness, and blatantly unconstitutional.  As one scholar noted, “[i]t is bad law, 
bad social policy, and bad mental health.”110  In attacking the mental health 
aspects of the opinion, Michael Perlin also deemed Hendricks a “confused and 
confusing opinion” that helped move sex offenders into the role of “monsters,” 
which was previously occupied by the mentally ill.111  Reflecting the historical 
work of Brakel and Cavanaugh, Perlin described the newest round of sex 
offender laws as a reaction to the least understood form of criminal behavior 
and an “ominous[] returning to the days of what many of us had thought was a 
less enlightened, and thus discarded, past.”112  Perlin believed that the 
pressures that helped create the newest batch of sexual predator laws also 
caused commitment proceedings to become pretextual, with judges and expert 
witnesses working to ensure the commitment of individuals who they believe 
need to be institutionalized, regardless of the individual’s actual psychological 
condition.113 
Similar criticisms attack Hendricks on constitutional terms, disagreeing 
with Justice Thomas’s decision that the KSVPA did not violate either 
substantive due process or the double jeopardy clause.  Critics postulate 
different reasons for the Court’s supposed inability to recognize the criminal 
nature of the Kansas statute and its punitive nature, but agree on the fact that 
the Court was too quick to dismiss the contention that Kansas had actually 
created a civil law that was another form of punishment and deterrence.114  
Critics of the decision almost universally have expressed one sentiment—
 
 109. Id. at 385-86. 
 110. Michael L. Perlin, “There’s No Success Like Failure/And Failure’s No Success At All”: 
Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 N.W. U. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1998). 
 111. Id. at 1248-49. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1252, 1258. 
 114. See, e.g., Andrew D. Campbell, Kansas v. Hendricks: Absent a Clear Meaning of 
Punishment, States Are Permitted to Violate Double Jeopardy Clause, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 87 
(1998) (arguing that the double jeopardy decision is inconsistent with prior decisions on that 
subject and that the failure of the Court to give a clear meaning to the term punishment 
significantly decreases Fifth Amendment protections against a police state); Adam D. Hirtz, 
Lock’Em Up and Throw Away the Key: Supreme Court Upholds Kansas’ Sexually Violent 
Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 545 (1998) (arguing that the Court 
employed faulty logic in demeaning the act nonpunitive and got caught up in the emotion of the 
conduct at issue in making its decision). 
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Hendricks is an abuse of governmental powers and an abuse of civil 
commitment, and the decision’s endorsement of civil commitment with little 
scrutiny of the methodology employed by the state of Kansas poses a 
significant threat to individual freedom and liberty.115 
B. Crane and the Necessary Standard of Lack of Control for Commitment 
Kansas would again be the battleground for the next major case to deal 
with the issue of civil commitment of sex offenders.  The case involved the 
commitment proceedings of Michael Crane, who pled guilty to one count of 
sexual battery arising from an incident in which he entered a video store and 
attempted to force a female employee to perform oral sex upon him.116  
Interestingly, although it implicitly referenced its belief and finding in In re 
Hendricks that the KSVPA was unconstitutional in its focus on punishment 
rather than treatment,117 the Kansas Supreme Court worked within the 
framework laid out by Justice Thomas’ majority opinion in Hendricks to attack 
the manner in which the jury was instructed as to Crane’s inability to control 
his own behavior.118 
The controlling issue in the case, as laid out by the court, was “whether it 
is constitutionally permissible to commit Crane as a sexual predator absent a 
 
 115. One commentator described the problem this way: 
The Court’s deference on this issue worries many commentators and judges because it 
may impose no limits on whom a state can civilly commit.  For instance . . . a state can 
[possibly] civilly commit individuals who commit violent crimes and who suffer from 
antisocial personality disorders.  Like the elements of criminal laws, however, the Court 
has traditionally deferred to state legislators regarding civilly confinable mental illness. 
Brian J. Pollock, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Workable Standard for “Mental Illness” or a Push 
Down the Slippery Slope Toward State Abuse of Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 348-
49 (1998). 
 116. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286 (Kan. 2000). 
 117. See id. at 287.  The Court goes through a detailed analysis of the interactions of the 
victim and the prosecutor in these cases during its initial laying out of the factual background of 
the case.  The Court first described how the victim was convinced by the prosecutor to go along 
with Crane’s initial guilty plea.  The prosecutor stated that obtaining a guilty plea “was the best 
way to go in order to be able to go down the line” and use the option of the Act.  The victim 
agreed to the plea bargain because she believed “it was the only way to make sure that it didn’t 
end there.”  Id.  (quoting victim’s testimony at civil commitment proceeding).  The victim then 
testified at the commitment proceeding that she understood that if the prosecution could get 
“some kind of conviction,” then the KSVPA could be used “later down the road to make sure he 
stays off the street.”  Id.  The prosecutor at the civil commitment case then used this information 
in his examination of the witness when he asked her the following questions: 
So would it be fair to say that for a crime that this Court gave a 35-to-life sentence to Mr. 
Crane, he only served a little over four years? . . . [a]nd understandably you’re very upset 
about how the system treated you in this case, right? 
Id.  The Court then proceeded to drop this issue completely in its analysis of the case and instead 
focused solely on the issue of ability to control behavior.  In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 287. 
 118. Id. at 287-88. 
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showing that he was unable to control his dangerous behavior.”119  The Kansas 
Court answered this question in the negative, agreeing with Crane that the 
Hendricks decision “read a requirement of inability to control behavior into the 
Act in order to uphold its constitutionality.”120  The court said this reading of 
Hendricks resulted from “the plain language of the majority opinion,” 
particularly Justice Thomas’ idea that such a statute must limit involuntary 
confinement to those whose difficulty in controlling behavior renders them 
dangerous beyond their own control.121  It was here that the Kansas Court was 
to make its finding that would become the epicenter of future analysis of this 
line of cases.  The court decided that, while there was some evidence that 
Crane had difficulty controlling his behavior, he was diagnosed only with a 
“personality disorder.”122  Because the issue of ability to control behavior was 
a jury issue, and the jury in Crane’s case was not instructed to make a finding 
regarding Crane’s inability to control his behavior, this failure to so instruct the 
jury necessitated the reversal and remand of the commitment decision.123  The 
argument regarding how to instruct a jury on the ability to control behavior and 
the necessity of doing so was the major issue in the Crane line of cases. 
The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari and addressed 
the issue of the constitutional requirements necessary for the KSVPA.  The 
Court vacated the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court, but did so while 
generally agreeing with that Court’s assessment of the Hendricks decision.  
This decision acts as a fine bit of irony because it was written by Justice 
Breyer, a dissenter in Hendricks.  Two justices, Scalia and Thomas, dissented 
in Crane, and Thomas was the justice who wrote the majority opinion in 
Hendricks.124 
The reason that the Court in Crane vacated and remanded the decision of 
the Kansas Supreme Court was that it read the Kansas decision to require a 
showing of complete lack of control.  As the Court frequently noted, the 
reference in Hendricks to difficulty in maintaining control of behavior is not an 
absolute requirement.125  The majority was quick to make clear that the 
decision to vacate did not indicate agreement with the State of Kansas’ 
position that the Constitution and Hendricks allow commitment of a dangerous 
 
 119. Id. at 287. 
 120. Id. at 290. 
 121. Id. at 290. 
 122. In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 290. 
 123. Id. 
 124. For these reasons, Crane serves as an excellent example of Justices “switching sides” in 
order to moderate an opinion or to mitigate the effects of a previous opinion.  For a broader 
discussion of this idea, see Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on 
Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999); Bernard Schwartz & James A. Thompson, 
Inside the Supreme Court: A Sanctum Sanctorum? 66 MISS. L.J. 177 (1996). 
 125. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-12 (2002). 
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sexual offender “without any lack-of-control determination.”126  Rather, the 
Hendricks decision underscored the importance of making distinctions 
between sexual offenders subject to commitment and those more appropriately 
dealt with through the criminal justice system.127  As the Court noted, “[t]hat 
distinction is necessary lest ‘civil commitment’ become a ‘mechanism for 
retribution or general deterrence’ – functions properly those of criminal law, 
not civil commitment.”128  Having clearly established the need for the state to 
demonstrate the respondent’s difficulty in controlling behavior, the majority in 
Crane proceeded to muddy the waters, creating confusion among state courts 
on the issue of lack of control. 
Justice Breyer, in discussing lack of control, said that this concept cannot 
be defined with “mathematical precision,” but rather proof of serious difficulty 
in controlling behavior is enough to meet this new requirement that the Court 
had laid out in interpreting Hendricks.129  In a bit of circular logic, Breyer then 
defined the concept of difficulty in controlling behavior, which he earlier 
identified as the distinguishing characteristic between those subject to civil 
commitment and those appropriately handled in the criminal justice system, in 
the following passage: 
And [the serious difficulty in controlling behavior], when viewed in light of 
such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the 
severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the 
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or 
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical 
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.130 
As the majority opinion recognized, “Hendricks as so read provides a less 
precise constitutional standard.”131  Believing that a bright-line rule was 
inappropriate in this situation, the Court instead left states with the assurance 
that “our cases suggest that civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders 
will normally involve individuals who find it particularly difficult to control 
their behavior.”132  This assessment may fall in line with the average jury’s 
view of someone subject to commitment, but it does not reflect the current 
struggle amongst the various states that have taken up the issue over what this 
new requirement necessitates. 
As mentioned previously, Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in Crane.  
The dissent focused on the necessity that courts enforce an additional 
 
 126. Id. at 412. 
 127. Id.  See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 128. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372-73 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J. concurring)). 
 129. Id. at 413. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 414. 
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requirement of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.  Justice Scalia 
insisted that the Hendricks opinion required that the “finding of a causal 
connection between the likelihood of repeat acts of sexual violence and the 
existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ necessarily 
establishes ‘difficulty if not impossibility’ in controlling behavior.”133  For 
Scalia then, the existence of the mental or personality disorder that results in 
the likelihood of recidivism established the difficulty of controlling behavior 
by itself.134 
Justice Scalia did recognize that the variable degree of difficulty finding 
required by the majority would leave trial courts without a clue as to how to 
instruct the jury under these new standards.135  Justice Scalia believed this 
failure of the majority to define the new standard for adequate jury instructions 
resulted from the Court’s inability to articulate a plausible standard.136  He 
went so far as to criticize the majority as “irresponsible” for leaving the law “in 
such a state of utter indeterminacy.”137  While one can argue the validity of 
both viewpoints on the question of the defendant’s difficulty in controlling 
behavior as outlined in Crane, the resulting split among state courts on the 
issue of jury instructions regarding the difficulty in controlling behavior 
requirement lends significant credence to Scalia’s position on this issue. 
IV.  DEFINING THE “LESS PRECISE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD”: THOMAS AND 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE CRANE DECISION 
The majority and the dissent in Crane acknowledged that the lack of 
control standard as laid out in that case was either deliberately imprecise or 
irresponsibly indeterminate.138  A major split has arisen since the Crane 
 
 133. Crane, 534 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 419-20. 
 135. Id. at 423. 
 136. Id. at 423-24. 
 137. Id. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Scalia goes on to criticize the majority’s opinion in 
even harsher terms: 
Today’s holding would make bad law in any circumstances . . . it both distorts our law 
and degrades our authority.  The State of Kansas, unable to apply its legislature’s sexual 
predator legislation as written because of the Kansas Supreme Court’s erroneous view of 
the Federal Constitution, sought and received certiorari in Hendricks, and achieved a 
reversal, in an opinion holding that “the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act comports 
with substantive due process requirements,” [citation omitted].  The Kansas Supreme 
Court still did not like the law and prevented its operation . . . once again.  The State of 
Kansas again sought certiorari, asking nothing more than reaffirmation of our 5-year-old 
opinion—only to be told that what we said then we now unsay.  There is an obvious 
lesson here for state supreme courts that do not agree with our jurisprudence: ignoring it is 
worth a try. 
Crane, 534 U.S. at 424. 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 124-37, 129-31. 
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decision regarding what the new standard means, and more precisely, what this 
decision requires of trial courts.  The particular problem is what instructions on 
lack of control the trial judge must give to the jury.  This section will examine 
Missouri’s approach to the problem, how other states have dealt with the issue 
in comparison, and which of the alternatives suggested by these various state 
courts meets the requisite intent and standard laid out by Crane and so 
vehemently opposed by the dissent in that case. 
A. Thomas and the Need for a Lack of Control Instruction 
Eddie Thomas was convicted in 1982 of multiple counts of forcible rape 
and forcible sodomy.  All of his victims were minors.139  After serving 
seventeen years of a twenty-three year sentence, Thomas was scheduled to be 
released in the summer of 1999.140  Before his release date, the State of 
Missouri petitioned to have him committed by the Missouri Department of 
Mental Health in accordance with Missouri’s sexual predator law.141  As the 
Thomas court recognized, the Kansas and Missouri sexual predator acts are 
virtually the same in all aspects relevant to this case.142  Missouri’s definition 
of a sexually violent predator subject to civil commitment, below, is 
substantially the same as the Kansas statute: 
[A]ny person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person 
more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not 
confined in a secure facility and who . . . [h]as pled guilty or been found 
guilty . . . of a sexually violent offense.143 
Likewise, Missouri treats the issue of a mental abnormality that qualifies a 
sexual predator for commitment in similar terms to Kansas: 
 
 139. Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 790 (Mo. 2002).  Thomas’s case was considered in 
conjunction with that of Desi Edwards.  Edwards was convicted of raping a child in 1989 and 
served eight years of a ten year sentence.  Id.  Edwards was released on parole in 1997, but was 
returned to prison after he violated his parole by using alcohol and failing to pay required fees.  
Id.  During this second incarceration, the State of Missouri moved to have Edwards committed 
under the state’s sexual predator law.  Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790.  Missouri’s Sexual Predator Statute can be found at MO. 
REV. STAT. § 632.480 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). 
 142. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790. 
 143. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(5).  Kansas’s statute reads as follows: “any person who has 
been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of 
sexual violence.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2002). 
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[A] congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional 
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a 
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.144 
The similarity between these two statutes allowed the Thomas court to conduct 
the analysis of the case under the direct precedent of Crane, and allowed the 
justices to address challenges both to the constitutionality of the Missouri 
statute and the validity of the jury instructions given at their commitment 
proceedings at the same time.145 
The Thomas court easily dismissed the first question because both 
Hendricks and Crane directly upheld the validity of a nearly identical sex 
offender commitment act in light of concerns about substantive due process, 
double jeopardy, and ex post facto law making.146  How these decisions, and in 
particular the Crane decision, affected the jury instruction issue became the 
focus of Thomas.  To best understand the Thomas decision, it is necessary to 
look at how the juries in the cases at issue were instructed. 
In the original trials for both Thomas and Edwards, the trial judges gave 
the juries the following instructions: 
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the 
respondent suffers from a mental abnormality, and . . . that as a result of this 
abnormality the respondent is more likely than not to engage in predatory acts 
of sexual violence if he is not confined in a secure facility, then you will find 
respondent is a sexually violent predator.147 
The instructions then went on to define mental abnormality exactly as the 
statute does,148 and to define “predatory” as “acts directed towards strangers or 
individuals with whom relationships have been established or promoted for the 
primary purpose of victimization.”149  The Missouri Supreme Court found 
these instructions to be deficient under the Crane standard.150 
After summarizing some of the relevant portions of the Crane and 
Hendricks decisions, the Thomas court made it clear that it believed these 
decisions uphold the constitutionality of sexual predator commitment laws so 
long as there is evidence to establish that the “mental abnormality” or 
“personality disorder” of the respondent causes serious difficulty in controlling 
their behavior and that the jury must also be instructed that the degree to which 
the person cannot control his or her behavior reaches the level of “serious 
 
 144. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(2) (2000).  The Kansas statute reads exactly the same as the 
Missouri statute.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994). 
 145. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790. 
 146. Id. at 791. 
 147. Id. at 790. 
 148. See supra note 144. 
 149. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790. 
 150. Id. 
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difficulty.”151  Thomas further concluded that the “serious difficulty” 
requirement found by the Supreme Court in Crane is simply a refinement of 
the term “mental abnormality,” not an addition of a newly created 
constitutional element to the validity of sex offender commitment laws.152  The 
clarification of “mental abnormality” by Crane and Thomas requires a specific 
type of jury instruction that was not given in either of the Missouri cases at 
issue.  A proper jury instruction must inform the jury of the “serious difficulty” 
in controlling behavior requirement in order to comply with Crane.153 
Chief Justice Limbaugh of the Missouri Supreme Court took issue with 
these findings of the Thomas majority in his dissent.154  Limbaugh’s basic 
contention was that “the Supreme Court made no mention whatsoever of the 
need for a new instruction” in Crane.155  He instead insisted in his dissent that 
the instruction given to the juries, “though couched in different language,” 
required the jury to reach the same conclusions regarding serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior as required in Crane.156  Limbaugh reached this decision 
through his argument that Crane was simply a clarification of “the 
constitutional threshold on which the Kansas statute had already been 
upheld.”157  Limbaugh believed that proving the existence of a “mental 
abnormality” that makes the individual more likely to commit future acts of 
sexual violence is a permissible way for the jury to find “serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior.”158 
Chief Justice Limbaugh went on to argue that the Supreme Court’s 
reaffirmation of the main holdings of Hendricks in Crane precludes the 
conclusion that a new instruction must be given because of its failure to 
distinguish between sex offenders who are simple recidivists and those whose 
mental condition make them subject to civil commitment.159  If the majority’s 
opinion were true, according to Limbaugh, Crane would then be requiring a 
new constitutional element within sexual predator statutes.160  The proper 
recourse for such a finding would be to strike down the statute as 
 
 151. Id. at 791. 
 152. Id. at 792 n. 1. 
 153. Id. at 792.  The entire instruction laid out by the Court read as follows: 
As used in this instruction, “mental abnormality” means a congenital or acquired 
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to 
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty 
in controlling his behavior. 
Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 792. 
 154. Id. (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 792-93. 
 159. Id. at 793. 
 160. Id. 
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unconstitutional, rather than rewriting the instruction, which effectively means 
rewriting the statute itself.161  Limbaugh believed this is what the majority had 
done, and he dismissed their argument that the new instruction is simply a 
“refinement” of existing language in the statute.162  As he argued in summary, 
if the old instruction was not constitutionally valid, the new instruction with 
different language “must mean something different than that used in the 
instruction that was given.”163  Such an interpretation should have required the 
court to decide that the instruction given was sufficient under Crane.164 
B. Other State Approaches to a Lack of Control Instruction 
A number of states, which have handled this issue since Crane was handed 
down, have reached different conclusions than that of the Missouri Supreme 
Court.  At least five other states have taken a different approach to the 
connection of dangerousness and mental abnormality that Thomas 
embraced.165  To illustrate these differences, this portion of the Note will 
examine other states that have handed down similar decisions disagreeing with 
the Thomas approach to the dangerousness requirement and the need for jury 
instructions on that matter. 
Florida’s Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (the “Ryce 
Act”) allows for the commitment of “sexually violent predators”166 who suffer 
from a “mental abnormality.”167  In 1999, a jury found Mitchell Westerheide, 
who had been convicted for lewd and lascivious assault on a child and sexual 
performance on a child, to be a sexually violent predator subject to 
commitment under the Ryce Act.168  After dismissing Westerheide’s claims of 
double jeopardy and other constitutional challenges to the statute based on both 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 793. 
 164. Id. 
 165. In addition to the states discussed in this Note, other states with sexual predator laws 
have also taken up this issue.  See, e.g., People v. Ghilotti, 44 P.3d 949 (Cal. 2002) (rejecting the 
necessity of an explicit jury instruction on difficulty in controlling behavior and interpreting the 
link between mental disorder and dangerousness as satisfying Crane because the particular form 
of dangerousness, a mental disorder, not the particular degree of dangerousness, distinguishes 
individuals subject to commitment from the typical recidivist). 
 166. Defined as anyone who “[h]as been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and . . . 
[s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage 
in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and 
treatment.”  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10)(a), (b) (2002). 
 167. Defined as “a mental condition affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity 
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
394.912(5) (2002). 
 168. Westerheide v. Florida, 831 So.2d 93, 97 (Fla. 2002). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1174 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1151 
Hendricks and Crane, the Florida Court turned to the issue of dangerousness 
and jury instructions. 
Much like Chief Justice Limbaugh’s arguments in Thomas, the Florida 
Supreme Court decided that Crane did not require a specific jury instruction, 
but rather only that there be proof of “serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior.”169  The majority found the instruction given in this case meant the 
jury had to conclude that Westerheide’s ability to control his dangerous 
behavior was impaired to the point that he posed a threat to others.  The court 
concluded this despite the fact that the words “serious difficulty” were not 
used, but simply that their meaning was conveyed to the jury.170  To further 
justify this conclusion, the court looked to the lack of a “bright-line rule” in 
Crane regarding the lack of control determination, and, as others before, 
pointed to Justice Breyer’s allusion to the lack of “mathematical precision” 
regarding the level of dangerousness necessary for a statute to remain 
constitutionally firm.171 
Wisconsin’s Supreme Court reached a similar decision in the case of John 
Lee Laxton.172  Laxton had been convicted on five different counts of sexual 
assault and child abduction and was paroled in 1994.173  His parole was 
revoked shortly thereafter when he was caught window peeping on two young 
female children.  Before his second scheduled release, the state of Wisconsin 
moved to have him committed under the state’s sexually violent person act.174  
This statute defined the key terms for commitment in substantially the same 
way as those previously discussed.175 
 
 169. Id. at 107. 
 170. Id. at 108.  The jury instructions read as follows: 
[M]ental condition affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity which 
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.  The term volitional means 
the act of will or choosing or the act of deciding or the exercise of will . . . [L]ikely to 
engage in acts of sexual violence means a person’s propensity to commit acts of sexual 
violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others. 
Id. 
 171. Id. at 109. 
 172. In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. 2002). 
 173. Id. at 787. 
 174. Id. 
 175. The statute defines “sexually violent person” as: 
[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated 
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of or not 
responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect 
or illness, and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from  mental disorder that 
makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence. 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (1998). 
“Mental disorder” is defined as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual 
violence.”  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (1998). 
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The jury in Laxton was instructed that the State must prove three elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt before they could order Laxton committed.  They 
were that he “[h]as been convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . has a 
mental disorder . . . [and] is dangerous to others because he has a mental 
disorder which creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of 
sexual violence.”176 
 The majority in Laxton upheld this instruction, finding as Westerheide did, 
that neither a separate factual finding nor a separate jury instruction was 
necessary on the issue of the sex offender’s level of difficulty in controlling 
behavior.177  Instead, evidence of a lack of control requirement identified in 
Crane could be established “by evidence of the individual’s mental disorder 
and requisite level of dangerousness,” which would distinguish the sex 
offender who has serious difficulty controlling behavior from the “dangerous 
but typical recidivist.”178 
The Laxton court justified this conclusion by saying that the due process 
requirement identified in Crane is satisfied by the Wisconsin’s statute’s 
“nexus” between an individual’s dangerousness and that person’s mental 
disorder.179  In order to commit a person under the statute, it must be 
established that a person is sexually violent, and this necessarily requires proof 
“that the person’s mental disorder includes serious difficulty in controlling his 
or her behavior.”180  The court believed that the Laxton jury, in finding it 
substantially probable that Laxton would engage in future acts of sexual 
violence, must have concluded that his mental abnormality created for him a 
serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.181 
Mirroring the dynamics of Thomas, the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court dissented from the majority opinion in Laxton.  As opposed to 
the majority’s detailed discussion of other issues, Chief Justice Abrahamson 
 
 176. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 787. 
 177. Id. at 793. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 794 (emphasis added).  Wisconsin’s Supreme Court is one of the few courts that 
has tackled this issue that has not assumed that those targeted for commitment will be males.  
Missouri’s Court of Appeals for the Eastern District dealt with the commitment case of a female 
sex offender shortly before the publication of this Note.  In that decision, the court ordered the 
release of the woman on the basis that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
that a female defendant was more likely than not to reoffend.  In re Coffel, 2003 WL 716682, No. 
ED 79989 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2003).  The Missouri Court of Appeals rendered its decision 
shortly before publication of this Note.  See In re Coffel, 2003 WL716682, No. ED79989 (Mo. 
Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2003).  For a study of female sexual offenders, see Catherine A. Lewis and 
Charlotte R. Stanley, Women Accused of Sexual Offenses, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 73 (2000) 
(finding that women accused of sexual offenses have a high likelihood of past or ongoing sexual 
and physical victimization). 
 181. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 795. 
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focused her entire dissent on the issue she believed to be the only important 
one of the case: “whether the jury instructions in the present case correctly 
advised the jury that it must be persuaded . . . that Laxton had serious difficulty 
in controlling his behavior.”182  She concluded that the jury instructions did not 
reach this standard and that, as a result, the validity of the jury determination 
must be called into question and vacated.183 
Chief Justice Abrahamson reached this conclusion because she believed 
the instructions could not have informed a reasonable jury that it needed to find 
that Laxton had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior in order to issue a 
commitment order.184  Justice Abrahamson accused the majority of reading “a 
constitutional gloss” into the sexual predator statute that would require a jury 
to act in a similar manner in order to correctly reach a proper decision on the 
issue of reasonableness.185  However, Justice Abrahamson believed this to be 
impossible because the serious difficulty in controlling behavior requirement 
of Crane does not equate with the Wisconsin instruction mandating a jury to 
find a mental disorder that affects “an individual’s emotional or volitional 
capacity.”186  Such an instruction as the one given did not require the jury to 
distinguish between sex offenders rendered dangerous because of their mental 
condition and ordinary recidivists, which was the overriding concern of 
Crane.187 
The Illinois Supreme Court also decided that no specific instruction was 
required in People v. Hancock.188  Two court-appointed psychologists 
diagnosed Hancock as a pedophile and voyeur with a history of exhibitionism, 
but disagreed over whether a pedophile was automatically sexually 
dangerous.189  While the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider 
Hancock’s prior sexual history in making its determination, it did not require a 
specific determination of lack of volitional control.190  Hancock appealed his 
conviction, but the Illinois Supreme Court decided that because the nature and 
severity of the mental disorder in sex predator cases distinguish individuals 
subject to commitment from the typical recidivist, the instructions given at the 
 
 182. Id. at 797 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id. at 798.  Justice Abrahamson wrote that “[a] jury instruction must fully and fairly 
inform the jury of the principles of law it should apply” in order to be upheld on appeal.  Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 798. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 771 N.E.2d 459 (Ill. App. 3d 2002).  Interestingly, unlike in other cases which have been 
discussed, Hancock had not been convicted of a prior sexual offense.  Id. at 461-62.  Instead, he 
was charged with sexual assault and sexual abuse, and the state of Illinois decided to pursue civil 
commitment rather than criminal charges in the matter.  Id. 
 189. Id. at 462. 
 190. Id. at 462-63. 
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trial level were constitutionally firm.191  In reaching this decision, the Illinois 
Supreme Court decided the focus of Crane should be on its reaffirmation of the 
Hendricks concern with distinguishing criminal and civil proceedings, rather 
than on the ability of the respondent to control his sexual behavior.192 
Massachusetts is another state that has rejected the need for a specific jury 
instruction on the level of difficulty in controlling behavior in a case from May 
2002, In re Dutil.193  Dutil was originally charged and sentenced to probation 
for indecent assault and battery on a minor.  He later violated his parole and 
subsequently pled guilty to similar charges stemming from a separate 
incident.194  Much like the Hancock court, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
focused on the Crane reaffirmation of the distinction between civil 
commitment and criminal punishment as originally outlined in Hendricks.195  
This focus allowed the court to interpret the sexually violent person 
commitment law as implicitly requiring a mental condition, even if specific 
terms are not used, and to interpret the instruction given as to the “general lack 
of power to control” as consistent with Crane.196  This interpretation brings 
Massachusetts in line with the other states that have rejected the specificity 
required for jury instructions on lack of control, as pronounced in Thomas. 
C. Missouri Got It Right – A Lack of Control Instruction is Necessary Under 
Crane 
Two very different views of the Crane decision have been laid out in these 
state cases on the issues of lack of control and dangerousness.  These 
differences of opinion over Crane’s view of the issue ultimately boil down to 
the necessity of a jury instruction.  In terms of the states that have addressed 
this issue, Thomas’ requirement of a specific instruction on lack of control is in 
the minority.197  Three different factors lead to the conclusion that the Thomas 
court reached the correct decision: a small piece of the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s decision in In re Crane and the Supreme Court’s approach to that case; 
 
 191. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d at 466. 
 192. Id. 
 193. 768 N.E.2d 1055 (Mass. 2002).  Dutil was convicted as a sexually dangerous person and 
confined to a treatment center in 1988.  Id.  He appealed his commitment order on the basis of the 
new constitutional standards he perceived Crane to have laid out.  Id. at 1058-59. 
 194. Id. at 1060. 
 195. Id. at 1061. 
 196. Dutil, 768 N.E.2d at 1063-64. 
 197. The Iowa Supreme Court recently agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in 
Thomas, becoming the first to join Missouri in this minority.  See In re Detention of Barnes, 658 
N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (finding that the jury instruction on the term “mental abnormality” 
was inadequate because it did not require a showing of serious difficulty in controlling behavior 
and adopting the instruction laid out by the Missouri Supreme Court in Thomas). 
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the logic behind the Court’s majority opinion in Crane; and finally, the dismay 
over the new standard set forth by the majority in Justice Scalia’s dissent. 
The Kansas Supreme Court in In re Crane held that “the Act cannot be 
applied to [Crane] in the absence of a finding that he was unable to control his 
behavior.”198  Indeed, the Kansas court’s decision was replete with references 
to the necessity of certain findings and instructions.  The court then connected 
the issues of finding and instructions in its summary of Hendricks when it 
wrote that a constitutionally sufficient finding “is a question for the jury, which 
was not instructed to make a finding as to Crane’s inability to control his 
behavior.”199  The failure to make such an instruction on lack of control was 
the reason the court reversed the commitment order of Crane, saying that “the 
failure to so instruct the jury was error and requires that we reverse and remand 
for a new trial.”200  In Crane, the United States Supreme Court said this 
decision was “an overly restrictive” interpretation of Hendricks.201  The Court 
in Crane did not take issue with the idea that some finding of dangerousness is 
necessary for a proper commitment order and that an instruction on the point is 
essential.  Instead, the Court only challenged the Kansas Court’s determination 
as to the degree of lack of control that must be established by the state in these 
proceedings. 
The strongest argument in support of the Thomas position on a jury 
instruction is the majority opinion in Crane.  The groundwork for Justice 
Breyer’s opinion was the idea, reestablished by Hendricks, that a statute that 
did not distinguish between ordinary recidivists and those sex offenders who 
could not control their behavior because of a mental condition, would be 
unconstitutional.  While Crane vacated the opinion of the Kansas Supreme 
Court, it did not decry the logic and reasoning of that court in finding it 
necessary that an inability to control behavior be established for commitment 
to be ordered.  Instead, Crane took issue with the degree of lack of control 
necessary before that threshold is reached.  Crane does not support the 
inference from the original trial court’s decision that the jury instructions, 
which did not include lack of control, were constitutional.  The majority 
opinion made no such mention of the validity of the trial court’s instructions.  
Ultimately, the very existence of the Crane decision mandates the conclusion 
that the Court was requiring the establishment of at least, as the Thomas court 
said, a “clarification” of the findings of mental abnormality.  If lack of control, 
as discussed in Crane, could simply be read into the current instructions of 
sexual predator laws, as states such as Wisconsin and Florida have argued, 
 
 198. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002). 
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then the Supreme Court would have restored the verdict of the original trial 
jury as opposed to simply vacating the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice Abrahamson made a very important point along this line in 
her dissent in Laxton: “The majority opinion’s linkage or nexus analysis of the 
jury instructions adopts Justice Scalia’s dissenting view in Crane.”202  Indeed, 
the dissent by Scalia supports the conclusion that Crane established a new 
requirement for sex offender commitment proceedings in order to maintain 
constitutionality, as previously argued.  Scalia’s entire argument was targeted 
at the lack of necessity in the majority opinion because it should be permissible 
for the current instructions to require a jury to make the lack of control finding 
argued for by the majority.203  Scalia also said in his dissent that the majority 
was “establishing the requirement of a separate finding of inability to control 
behavior” in its decision.204  Furthermore, he thought this distinction and 
clarification was unnecessary, which was the basis of his reasoning. 
Scalia’s language in arguing against the majority’s “less precise 
constitutional standard” also gives away the fact that he believed the Crane 
decision was creating a jury instruction requirement.  Much of his attack on the 
potential problems that could be created by the majority decision stem from his 
belief that it necessitated both the need for a finding and an instruction on lack 
of control.205  As Scalia said, the majority decision is fundamentally flawed 
because “it gives trial courts, in future cases under the many commitment 
statutes similar to Kansas’s SVPA, not a clue as to how they are supposed to 
charge the jury!”206  The fact that Scalia went into some depth in exploring 
what necessary instructions should be given to juries in such cases,207 and that 
he admonished the majority for its “irresponsibility” in failing to give the trial 
 
 202. In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784, 797 (Wis. 2002). 
 203. Crane, 534 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. at 419. 
 205. Id. at 420. 
 206. Id. at 423. 
 207. Scalia’s discussion of this issue is emphasized by his listing of potential jury charges: 
How is one to frame for a jury the degree of “inability to control” which, in the particular 
case, “the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality” 
require?  Will it be a percentage (“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may commit Mr. 
Crane under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is 42% unable 
to control his penchant for sexual violence”)?  Or a frequency ratio (“Ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane under the SVPA only if you find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is unable to control his penchant for sexual violence 3 
times out of 10”)?  Or merely an adverb (“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may 
commit Mr. Crane under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is 
appreciably—or moderately, or substantially, or almost totally—unable to control his 
penchant for sexual violence”)?  None of these seems to me satisfactory. 
Id at 423-24. 
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court specific instructions208 in this case, further substantiates the conclusion 
that instructions themselves are what Crane requires. 
All three important parts of the Crane decision on the state and federal 
level point to the conclusion of the Missouri Supreme Court in Thomas that a 
specific instruction is necessary on the issue of lack of control to ensure that 
the due process protections of Crane are met.  Chief Justice Abrahamson 
articulated it best in her dissent in Laxton when she stated the following to both 
the majority in Laxton and other state courts that have chosen to adopt the 
position of Justice Scalia in Crane: “The court is obliged to follow the majority 
opinion in Crane, not the dissent.”209  A more succinct summary of the 
inadequacy of the state decisions in opposition to Thomas is not likely to be 
formulated in other terms. 
V.  THE DANGER NEXT DOOR: WHY JURY INSTRUCTIONS DO NOT OFFER 
ADEQUATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS 
Assuming that a lack of control is required, as this Note argues, what 
difference will this make in actual commitment proceedings?  The answer to 
this question is that an instruction will make little to no difference in the 
likelihood of a jury ordering commitment of a convicted sex offender.  An 
excerpt from Crane illustrates this problem: 
Ordinary recidivists choose to reoffend and are therefore amenable to 
deterrence through the criminal law; those subject to civil commitment under 
the SVPA, because their mental illness is an affliction and not a choice, are 
unlikely to be deterred.210 
 In light of this distinction between those subject to commitment and those 
who are not, along with the fact that nearly all those subject to commitment 
proceedings are convicted sex offenders, the one avenue left open for a 
defendant to avoid commitment in these proceedings is to argue that the 
individual does not have a problem controlling behavior–rather, the 
individual’s acts of sexual misconduct are willful and intentional!  It seems 
highly illogical to believe that a jury is going to release such a person into 
society regardless of constitutional mandates or the manner in which it is 
instructed. 
The history of sexual predator laws also lends credence to the idea that 
modern proceedings nearly guarantee an extended form of punishment for any 
sex offender who is put before a jury.  As Brakel and Cavanaugh noted in their 
description of mid-twentieth century commitment laws, “[t]he procedural 
shortcuts permitted by most statutes could be winked at, given the benign 
 
 208. Crane, 534 U.S. at 423-24. 
 209. In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784, 798 (Wis. 2002). 
 210. Crane, 534 U.S. at 420. 
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intentions and predicted good outcomes” of these laws.211  Indeed, the entire 
history behind the modern development of registration, community notification 
and commitment laws speaks to the fact that such measures are designed to 
alleviate public fears and protect them from these “monsters” who otherwise 
would be living amidst the general public without the community’s knowledge. 
It is also important to mention some of the other evidentiary rules that 
govern these proceedings and how, in combination with known public fears of 
sex offenders, they almost guarantee commitment of those targeted by the 
State.  Many states have rules that allow for the unsupervised examination of 
offenders by state experts, the deposing of offenders, and the testimony of 
victims at trial.212  Only in Wisconsin do proceedings guarantee the sex 
offender the same rights as in a criminal trial, including Fifth Amendment 
rights against self-incrimination and the ability to decide whether or not a jury 
trial is conducted.  Such a system of proceeding raises serious concerns about 
the legitimacy and integrity of the system, while also raising a number of 
collateral situations that present potential problems.213 
An examination of the Missouri sexual predator statutes and a recent case 
on the ability to appeal a commitment order under the act lend insight into this 
problem.  While a “detained person” subject to possible commitment under the 
law has a right to counsel, present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses, 
Missouri law mandates that such an individual be examined by a state 
psychologist for assessment, and that psychologist may also interview family 
members and friends of the sex offender and the past victims of the sex 
offender.214  In addition, at the trial itself, the state or the judge can decide to 
have a jury trial regardless of the sex offender’s preference, although a jury 
trial does require a unanimous decision on commitment to be effective.215  
 
 211. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 72. 
 212. See generally Richard L. Polin, Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Proceedings: A 
Proposal for Rules of Procedure, 75 FLA. BAR J. 51 (2001); Joelle Anne Moreno, Whoever Fights 
Monsters Should See to it That in the Proces [sic] She Does not Become a Monster: Hunting the 
Sexual Predator with Silver Bullets –Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 — and a Stake Through 
the Heart – Kansas v. Hendricks,” 49 FLA. L. REV. 505 (1997). 
 213. A small point in In re Crane case illustrates one of these issues.  At trial, Crane 
attempted to stipulate to his past sexual behaviors and convictions, but the trial court held that 
under the open door policy of the proceedings the State was allowed to illustrate his past history 
in whatever manner it desired.  In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 293 (Kan. 2000).  See also Bradford v. 
Mo. Dept. of Corrections, 46 Fed. Appx. 857 (8th Cir. 2002) (raising concerns over sex 
offenders’ fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself or herself); Michael Booth, Court 
Bars Civil-Commitment Waiver as Lure For Sex Offender’s Guilty Plea, 168 N.J. L.J. 171 (2002) 
(reporting on a New Jersey court’s decision to disallow a prosecutor’s decision to waive the right 
to seek post-incarceration civil commitment in exchange for a guilty plea to a sex offense). 
 214. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.489 (1999). 
 215. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 632.492, 632.495 (1999).  As has been discussed, the likelihood of a 
jury failing to return a commitment order in these cases is extremely low. 
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Most importantly, because Missouri considers these cases to be civil matters 
rather than criminal in nature, normal rules of criminal procedure and evidence 
do not apply.  Instead, the state is free to call the past victims of the sex 
offender, introduce evidence of prior bad acts, and force the sex offender to 
testify against himself in the form of the mandated psychological interviews by 
the State.216  Such clear violations of the constitutional protections afforded a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding are justified by the civil label that is applied 
to the commitment proceedings.217 
The problems created by this withdrawal of certain rights in the civil 
setting in Missouri, and the confusion in the courts over the civil/criminal 
dichotomy, is blazingly apparent in a recent decision, Ingrassia v. State.218  In 
that case the Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal 
of Ingrassia, who was twice convicted of crimes of sexual misconduct and 
ordered committed by a jury as a sexual predator in April 2001.219  The State 
moved for the dismissal of Ingrassia’s appeal on the basis of the “escape rule,” 
a judicially created doctrine in Missouri “that operates to deny the right of 
appeal to a defendant who escapes justice.”220  Although the rule had only 
previously been applied to criminal cases (and thus refers to the “defendant” 
escaping), the court decided to extend the rule to civil commitment 
proceedings involving an individual committed under the sexually violent 
predator statutes.  The court rationalized this decision by arguing that Ingrassia 
had removed himself from their control, had created several administrative 
difficulties, and the state was justified in trying to discourage escape by 
sexually violent predators committed to institutions because Ingrassia’s escape 
 
 216. For criticism of similar encroachment on the rights of defendants in criminal cases 
involving sexual offenses through the use of modified rules of evidence, see Moreno, supra note 
212, and James J. Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex 
Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95 (1994).  But see Sherry 
L. Scott, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity 
Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1729 (1999). 
 217. It could be argued that the sexual predator statutory requirements that precede a civil 
commitment hearing overcome these evidentiary and jury concerns.  These requirements include 
diagnosis by a state psychiatrist as having a mental disorder, designation by a state official as a 
sexual predator, and a preliminary hearing before a judge.  Putting aside the scientific disputes 
regarding diagnosis of sex offenders (see supra Section II, Part C) and the need to guarantee 
constitutional protections at trial despite whatever might precede it, a number of cases reveal the 
fact that questionable commitment decisions still occur.  A good example of these problems 
involve commitment as sex offenders of people who are clearly suffering from “normal” mental 
illnesses.  See, e.g., People v. Moore, 2002 WL 2017087, No. B152102 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 
2002) (committing a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic as a sexual offender). 
 218. 2002 WL 31749394, No. ED 80012 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2002). 
 219. Id. at *1. 
 220. Id. at *1-2. (quoting State v. Troupe, 891 S.W. 2d 808, 809 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)).  
Ingrassia had “escaped” from a mental institution in October 2002.  Id. at *1. 
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“demonstrates disrespect for our system of justice.”221  The Missouri Court’s 
solution to the above concerns was an application of a criminal remedy to a 
supposedly civil proceeding which, in effect, denies this group of individuals 
the ability to have their rights adequately protected.  Better evidence of the 
difficulties in keeping the criminal versus civil distinction clear on the part of 
judicial actors is hard to find and point to the inherent deficiencies in 
maintaining the constitutionality of the statutes involved by a declaration that 
they are civil in nature.222 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Kansas Supreme Court described the dangers of the approach to 
sexually violent predators that has been adopted by the states and approved by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the following manner: 
[It has] the insidious effect of sanctioning the separation of the commitment of 
sexually violent predators from the statutory procedure for the commitment of 
the mentally ill.  Once that is accomplished, the same reasoning could be 
applied to anyone who commits any designated offense and is labeled 
“mentally abnormal” or suffering from an “anti-social personality disorder.”223 
This observation highlights the following two major theses of this Note: first, 
that a jury that is not required to make a finding as to lack of control fails to 
reach the constitutional standard established in Crane and second, such an 
instruction, if given, will fail to overcome the inherent deficiencies of a civil 
commitment scheme for sex offenders. 
Public concern and fear of sex offenders will almost universally guarantee 
a decision of commitment regardless of any constitutional restraints placed 
before the jury.224  The ability of state governments to eradicate the rights and 
protections of sex offenders through civil statutes shows the dangerous way in 
which these powers can be used to infringe on constitutional rights.  Efforts to 
civilly commit other groups of people deemed dangerous show the lack of 
limits to this perverse line of reasoning.225  When the costs and prior failures of 
 
 221. Id. at *3. 
 222. See generally Polin, supra note 212, for an analysis of possible rules of procedure for 
one sexually violent predator statutory scheme. 
 223. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996). 
 224. See Michelle Johnson, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and The Sentencing of 
Sexual Predators, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 39 (1998) (arguing that Hendricks is an example of 
the Court bowing to public concern despite the absence of solid constitutional footing); Robert 
Billbrey, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: A Misguided Attempt to Solve a 
Serious Problem, 55 J. MO. BAR 321 (1999); Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting 
Justice to Punish Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199 (2000). 
 225. For efforts on commitment of pregnant drug addicts and substance abusers, see David F. 
Chavkin, “For Their Own Good”: Civil Commitment of Alcohol and Drug-Dependent Pregnant 
Women, 37 S.D. L. REV. 224 (1992); Jean R. Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1184 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1151 
such a system are factored in, it becomes obvious that punitive measures 
should be reserved for the states’ criminal justice systems, where fears and 
treatment of sexual offenders can more properly be addressed.  Under this 
light, civil commitment can be seen as endemic of a criminal justice system 
that focuses on punishment rather than rehabilitation, resulting in a system 
forced to deal with convicts of all types who are likely to recommit. 
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